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Response to Professor Kent Greenawalt’s
Lecture

STEVEN D. SMITH*

It is an honor for me to be able to comment on this lecture by
Professor Kent Greenawalt, who is one of the people in the legal
academy I admire most, as a scholar and as a person. Twenty-five years
ago, at the first academic conference I ever attended, as a spectator, Kent
was one of the principal speakers, and he presented a paper that helped
to initiate a major and important debate on the role of religion in
political decisionmaking.1 A few years later, I spent a week at Columbia
in a sort of mini-visit. It was December, so it was cold and dark, and I
was staying alone in a heartless hotel, and during my days there it
seemed that I was constantly being challenged and interrogated by one
faculty member after another. One evening, though, Kent invited me
over to his apartment for a friendly conversation for an hour or so. That
was the highlight of my Columbia visit; I still remember the occasion
fondly.
So I was excited when, a couple of years ago, the Harvard Law
Review asked me to write a substantial review of Kent’s most recent
book on the Establishment Clause.2 And this turned out to be an
*
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1. Kent Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious
Conviction: Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011
(1986). Kent himself has been one of the leading ongoing contributors to this debate.
See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995);
KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
2. 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, ESTABLISHMENT AND
FAIRNESS (2008).
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enjoyable and rewarding project for me—both in reading the book and
writing the review. The only painful part was that I did feel compelled
to make some critical observations about the book, which Kent has
quoted here tonight.3 However, my review also offered many laudatory
comments,4 and even the critical observations—about the book’s many
“highly conclusory pronouncements”—were intended to be critical in a
laudatory sense.
That remark may seem paradoxical, or worse, but let me explain.
There seems to be widespread agreement that the jurisprudence of the
First Amendment’s religion clauses is unsatisfactory. Much of my own
work in this area has been diagnostic in character; it tries to ascertain
what the predicament is and how we managed to get into this predicament.
And one diagnosis I have sometimes offered, including in my review of
Kent’s book, might be called the “exhausted tradition” account. The
suggestion is that religion clause jurisprudence is unsatisfactory because
it reflects the exhaustion of a centuries-long tradition of trying to reason
about the proper relation between government and religion.
Here is a slightly more detailed, but still very summary, elaboration.5
Modern commitments to religious freedom are derived, I would argue,
from a long history of thought and action that was anchored in a
dualistic Christian worldview in which God and Caesar were believed to
work through independent authoritative institutions—church and state—
and to impose independent but valid obligations on their subjects.
“Render therefore unto Caesar the things which be Caesar’s, and unto
God the things which be God’s.”6 The medieval effort to free the church
from Caesar’s rule—to achieve freedom of the church—was a progenitor of
the modern commitment to separation of church and state. In the postReformation period, as the functions and dignity of the church came to
be transferred in part to the individual conscience, freedom of the church
gave rise to a fierce devotion to freedom of conscience—a cause for

3. See Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion Clauses:
Reflections on Some Critiques, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1131, 1132–33 (2010) (reporting
my criticism of the book for “highly conclusory pronouncements”).
4. Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?,
122 HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1871 (2009) (“[F]or a careful, fair-minded analysis of the cases
and arguments with respect to virtually any establishment controversy that a judge or
scholar may be investigating, one could hardly do better than to consult Greenawalt’s
treatment.”); id. at 1906–07 (suggesting that Greenawalt “is, so to speak, a Jan van Eyck
of legal reasoning”).
5. For a much more detailed presentation, see STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT
OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 107–50 (2010).
6. Luke 20:25 (King James).
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which thousands suffered martyrdom. This cause culminated in the modern
constitutional commitment to free exercise of religion.
The religious origins of religious freedom were tersely but clearly
reflected in the explicitly theological rationales offered, for example, in
James Madison’s famous Memorial and Remonstrance and in Jefferson’s
celebrated Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. The problem is that
in contemporary circumstances many scholars and jurists—including Kent
—argue that it is constitutionally impermissible, under the Establishment
Clause, for government to rely on such religious rationales.7 In this way,
religious freedom comes to snub or subvert its own supporting rationales,
and thus threatens to cancel itself out. And the discourse comes to have
an unmoored quality. I have argued that in these circumstances it becomes
difficult to explain why religion deserves special constitutional treatment
or give persuasive rational justifications for the various positions for
which people want to argue; the unsatisfactory condition of religious
clause discourse reflects these difficulties.8
Kent’s recent volumes provide valuable—albeit unintended—support
for this explanation, I have suggested, but not because Kent’s reasoning
is deficient. On the contrary, his book reflects the exhaustion of the
tradition precisely because he is so careful and honest in his reasoning.
Other advocates sometimes try to make it appear that “reason” supports
their conclusions by slighting the requirements of reason. So they neglect to
notice some of the arguments that run contrary to their position. Or they
present those arguments in a tendentious way. Or they engage in subtle—
or not so subtle—ad hominem criticism of their opponents. Kent, by
contrast, is too honest and scrupulous to resort to such tactics. He carefully
and fairly presents all of the significant arguments on both sides of a
contested issue.
And the result, usually, is a kind of impasse. There are pro and con
arguments, and reasoning cannot decisively vindicate either side, and so
there is nothing left but to declare which side one favors—on the basis
of considerations or influences that elude rational articulation and that
are necessarily more personal or perhaps political in nature. It seems to
me that Kent’s lecture tonight does not so much contest this account of

7. Kent explains his reasons for drawing this conclusion in Part III of the present
lecture. See Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 1139.
8. I argued for this point at length in Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of
Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 180–96 (1991).
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our condition as embrace it, suggesting that this is the best we can do.
He may well be right. His example of Dan and Daisy certainly rings true
to me. But this conclusion, I think, simply underscores the limitations of
reason, at least in this area.
It is probably apparent that Kent’s work tries more than my more
diagnostic work does to provide practical guidance on the contested
issues of the day. But I think my diagnosis, if it is correct, is not entirely
lacking in practical implications. More specifically, I think my diagnosis
suggests the wisdom of greater judicial deference in this area than many
people, including Kent, favor. If you want a court to invalidate some
legislative enactment, you are on firmest ground if you can persuasively
argue—depending on your view of constitutional interpretation—that (a)
the enactment is inconsistent with the original meaning of First
Amendment,9 or (b) the enactment is inconsistent with a contemporary
consensus of “We the People” as to what government can properly do,
or (c) the enactment is inconsistent with some persuasive normative
theory. Conversely, if none of these arguments can persuasively be
made, the case for invalidation is weak.
Take the example Kent has mentioned tonight of the words “under
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance.10 Kent briefly reiterates the position
taken in his book—that that these words should in principle be declared
unconstitutional—although, given the popular opposition such a ruling
would provoke, this might be a rare case in which courts should hold
back for purely prudential reasons. But I do not understand him to
contend that the words in the pledge violate the original understanding
of the Establishment Clause or that they are at odds with any current
consensus of “We the People,” and he expressly refrains from offering
any normative theory that could condemn those words. So I believe this
case illustrates how the limitations of reasoning that Kent discusses—
and that he performatively demonstrates precisely by being so careful
and scrupulous in his own reasoning—count against the kind of active
judicial review he advocates.

9. This is the approach that Professor Alexander’s response advocates. See Larry
Alexander, Response to Professor Kent Greenawalt’s Lecture, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1153, 1155 (2010).
10. Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 1143.
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